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Abstract
The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these
metaphors influence the way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information about them. We find
that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor (via a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people
attempt to solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make ‘‘well-informed’’ decisions.
Interestingly, we find that the influence of the metaphorical framing effect is covert: people do not recognize metaphors as
influential in their decisions; instead they point to more ‘‘substantive’’ (often numerical) information as the motivation for
their problem-solving decision. Metaphors in language appear to instantiate frame-consistent knowledge structures and
invite structurally consistent inferences. Far from being mere rhetorical flourishes, metaphors have profound influences on
how we conceptualize and act with respect to important societal issues. We find that exposure to even a single metaphor
can induce substantial differences in opinion about how to solve social problems: differences that are larger, for example,
than pre-existing differences in opinion between Democrats and Republicans.
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Introduction
Both crime, and the criminal justice system designed to deal
with crime, impose tremendous costs on society. Over 11 million
serious crimes are reported in the United States each year [1], and
the US has the highest per capita imprisonment rate of any
country [2]. Despite being home to only 5% of the world’s
population, the United States holds 25% of the world’s prisoners,
with nearly 1% of the US population living behind bars [3].
Addressing the crime problem is an issue of central importance in
social policy. How do people conceptualize crime, and how do
they reason about solving the crime problem?
Public discourse about crime is saturated with metaphor.
Increases in the prevalence of crime are described as crime waves,
surges or sprees. A spreading crime problem is a crime epidemic,
plaguing a city or infecting a community. Crimes themselves are attacks in
which criminals prey on unsuspecting victims. And criminal investiga-
tions are hunts where criminals are tracked and caught. Such
metaphorical language pervades not only discourse about crime,
but nearly all talk about the abstract and complex [4–5]. Are such
metaphors just fancy ways of talking, or do they have real
consequences for how people reason about complex social
problems like crime?
Previous work has demonstrated that using different metaphors
can lead people to reason differently about notions like time,
emotion, or electricity [6–11]. For example, people’s reasoning
about electricity flow differed systematically depending on the
metaphoric frame used to describe electricity (flowing water vs.
teeming crowds) [6]. Such findings on metaphorical framing are
grounded in a larger body of work that has established the
importance of linguistic framing in reasoning [12], and the
importance of narrative structure in instantiating meaning [13].
However, questions about the pervasiveness of the role of metaphor
inthinkingremain.Criticsarguethat verylittle workhasempirically
demonstrated that metaphors in language influence how people
think about and solve real-world problems [14].
In this paper we investigate the role of metaphor in reasoning
about a domain of societal importance: social policy on crime.
Beyond establishing whether metaphors play a role in how people
reason about crime, our studies are designed to further illuminate
the mechanisms through which metaphors can shape understand-
ing and reasoning. If metaphors in language invite conceptual
analogies, then different metaphors should bring to mind different
knowledge structures and suggest different analogical inferences.
In this paper we ask if metaphors indeed play such a role in
reasoning about social policy. That is, do we reason about
complex social issues in the same way that we talk about them:
through a patchwork of metaphors?
Some observations of crime policy in the real world suggest that
people may indeed take metaphors as more than just talk. For
example, shifts in metaphors are often accompanied by shifts in
policy. In the 1980s Ronald Reagan declared a war on drugs, with
smugglers, dealers, and users defined as the enemy to be fought.
Policies in line with the war on drugs mandated longer, harsher
sentences for drug-related crime. Since then, the incarceration rate
has more than quadrupled in the US [15].
Others have taken the crime is a virus metaphor seriously and
have implemented programs to treat crime as a contagious disease.
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ogist in Chicago treats crime according to the same regimen used
for diseases like AIDS and tuberculoses, focusing on preventing
spread from person to person [16].
Some criminal justice scholars have even implicated bad
metaphor as the root of failure in crime prevention [17]. In one
case described by Kelling, a serial rapist attacked 11 girls over a
15-month period before being captured by the police. During
those 15 months, the police had information that (had they shared
it with the community) could have prevented some of the attacks.
Instead, they opted to keep that information secret to set traps for
their suspect. The police, on Kelling’s analysis, were entrenched in
their metaphorical role of hunting down and catching the
criminal, and neglected their responsibility to inoculate the
community against further harm. The girls, Kelling writes, ‘‘were
victims… not only of a rapist, but of a metaphor’’ (p. 1).
In this paper we empirically investigate whether using different
metaphors to talk about crime indeed leads people to reason about
crime differently and, in turn, leads them to propose different
solutions to the crime problem. We will focus on two contrasting
metaphors for crime: crime as a virus and crime as a beast. Do
these metaphors subtly encourage people to reason about crime in
a way that is consistent with the entailments of the metaphors? For
example, might talking about crime as a virus lead people to
propose treating the crime problem the same way as one would
treat a literal virus epidemic? Might talking about crime as a beast
lead people to propose dealing with a crime problem the same way
as one would deal with a literal wild animal attack?
To help generate a clear set of predictions, we conducted a
norming survey asking 28 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (www.mturk.com; [18]) to describe what should be done to
solve a literal virus or beast problem. We asked people to imagine
a ‘‘virus infecting a city’’ or a ‘‘wild beast preying on a city’’ and
then to describe the best way to solve the problem that they had
imagined. Participants who imagined a ‘‘virus infecting the city’’
universally suggested investigating the source of the virus and
implementing social reforms and prevention measures to decrease
the spread of the virus. That is, they wanted to know where the
virus was coming from, whether the city could develop a vaccine
and how the virus was spreading. They also wanted to institute
educational campaigns to inform residents about how to avoid or
deal with the virus and encourage residents to follow better
hygiene practices. Participants who imagined a ‘‘wild beast
preying on a city’’ universally suggested capturing the beast and
then killing or caging it. They wanted to organize a hunting party
or hire animal control specialists to track down the beast and stop
it from ravaging the city.
Might these schematic representations for solving literal virus or
beast problems transfer to people’s reasoning about crime if crime
is metaphorically framed as a virus or a beast? That is, if crime is
talked about as a virus, will people suggest diagnosing the root
cause of the problem and enacting social reform to treat and
inoculate the community? If crime is a beast, will people suggest
catching and jailing criminals in order to fight off the crime attack?
In Experiment 1, we gave people a report about increasing
crime rates in the City of Addison and asked them to propose a
solution. For half of the participants, crime was metaphorically
described as a beast preying on Addison, and for the other half as a
virus infecting Addison. The rest of the report contained crime
statistics that were identical for the two metaphor conditions. The
results revealed that metaphors systematically influenced how
people proposed solving Addison’s crime problem. When crime
was framed metaphorically as a virus, participants proposed
investigating the root causes and treating the problem by enacting
social reform to inoculate the community, with emphasis on
eradicating poverty and improving education. When crime was
framed metaphorically as a beast, participants proposed catching
and jailing criminals and enacting harsher enforcement laws.
In Experiment 2, we modified the report and repeated the
study. Whereas in Experiment 1, the metaphoric frame was
established using vivid verbs with rich relational meaning in
phrases scattered throughout the report (e.g., crime was said to be
either preying & lurking, or infecting & plaguing). In Experiment
2, we used a single word to instantiate the metaphoric frame.
Despite this small difference between the virus and beast con-
ditions in the modified report (‘‘Crime is a virus/beast ravaging
the city of Addison’’), we again found that participants in the two
conditions offered different problem solving suggestions. The
findings of Experiment 2 demonstrate that these relational ele-
ments need not be specified explicitly. People spontaneously
extracted the relevant relational inferences even given a single
metaphorical noun in Experiment 2.
In Experiment 3 we tested whether the influence of the metaphor
observed in the first two studies could have come about through
simple spreading activation from lexical associates of the words
‘‘beast’’ and ‘‘virus.’’ Perhaps simply hearing a word like beast, even
outside of the context of crime, would activate representations of
hunting and caging. These activated lexical associates might then
bleed into people’s descriptions of how to solve the crime problem.
To test for this possibility we dissociated the words ‘‘beast’’ and
‘‘virus’’ from the metaphorical frame in Experiment 3. Before
reading the crime report, participants were asked to provide a
synonym to the word‘‘beast’’ orthe word ‘‘virus’’ – thereby priming
representations for a beast or a virus. They then read the same
report about crime as in Experiment 2, but with the metaphorical
word omitted (‘‘Crime is ravaging the city of Addison’’). This
disconnected lexical prime did not yield differences in people’s
crime-fighting suggestions, revealing that metaphors act as more
than just isolated words – their power appears to come from
participating in elaborated knowledge structures.
In Experiment 4 we tested whether metaphors can affect not only
how people propose solving the problem of crime,but also how they
go about gathering information for future problem solving. If
participants seek out information that is likely to confirm the initial
bias suggested by the metaphor, this may be a mechanism for
metaphors to iteratively amass long-term effects on people’s
reasoning. Indeed, when people were presented with a metaphor-
ically framed crime problem and then given the opportunity to
gather further information about the issue, participants chose to
lookatinformation thatwasconsistentwith the metaphoricalframe.
In Experiment 5 we investigated the time-course ofhow metaphors
influence the construal of complex issues. One possibility is that
metaphors influence reasoning by providing people a knowledge
frame that structures subsequent information. After being exposed to
the metaphor, participants assimilate all further information they
receive into this knowledge structure, instantiating any ambiguous
information in a way that would be consistent with the metaphor. If
this is the case, if metaphors actively coerce incoming information,
then metaphors should have the most impact when they are
presented early. This was the structure of the report in Experiment 4
(and Experiment 2): the metaphoric frame was presented in the first
sentence of the report.
Alternatively, if metaphors simply activate a stored package of
ideas and do not encourage the kind of active assimilation process
described above, then they should be most effective when they are
presented late in the narrative, as close to when people are asked
to reason about a solution as possible. This way, the memory of
the metaphor should be fresh and any knowledge activated by it
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structure of the report in Experiment 5: the metaphoric frame was
presented in last sentence of the report. Unlike the results of
Experiment 4, this late metaphorical framing had no effect on
people’s crime-related information foraging. These findings
suggest that metaphors can gain power by coercing further
incoming information to fit with the relational structure suggested
by the metaphor.
One of the most interesting features of the effects of meta-
phor we find throughout these studies is that its power is
covert. When given the opportunity to identify the most influential
aspect of the crime report, participants (in all four studies that
include a metaphoric frame) ignore the metaphor. Instead, they
cite the crime statistics (which are the same in both conditions)
as being influential in their reasoning. Together these studies
suggest that unbeknownst to us, metaphors powerfully shape
how we reason about social issues. Further, the studies help shed




The experiments reported here were done in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. Additionally, they followed the ethical
requirements of the Stanford University institutional review board
and complied with ethics guidelines set forth by the IRB
recommendations. Participants were informed that their data
would be treated anonymously and that they could terminate the
experiment at any time without providing any reason. We received
written informed consent from all participants before they
participated in an experiment.
Participants
In Experiment 1, 485 students – 126 from Stanford University
and 359 from the University of California, Merced – participated
in the study as part of a course requirement. Experiments 2–5
were conducted online with participants recruited from Amazon’s
mechanical Turk (347, 312, 185, and 190, respectively).
In exchange for participation in the study, people were paid
$1.60 – consistent with a $10/hour pay rate since the study took 5
to 6 minutes to complete.
Gathering data from these various sub-populations allowed us
to sample a broader cross-section of the general population. This is
important since people’s conceptions of social issues like crime are
likely to differ as a function of factors like socioeconomic status and
personal experience. This is particularly true of the sample that
was recruited online, which was more diverse than that available
at Stanford specifically or on college campuses generally [18].
Running Experiments 2–5 online also afforded careful control
over our sample population. We used Mechanical Turk’s exclusion
capabilities and tracked IP addresses to ensure that participants
were not repeatedly sampled. We also restricted our study to
Turkers with a 95% or better performance record to ensure that
we were sampling high quality participants (‘‘Requesters’’ have the
opportunity to publicly give positive or negative feedback to their
participants, which can then be used as a criterion for future
‘‘Requesters’’). At the end of the online version of the study we
asked participants to describe their language history, current
geographic location, and provide some background information.
We then restricted our analysis to residents of the United States
who were native English speakers. The characteristics of our
samples are detailed in the Results section below.
Materials
In each of the five experiments, participants were presented
with a survey that included a short paragraph about crime in the
fictional city of Addison and some follow-up questions. The survey
differed subtly between experiments, but always contrasted a
crime-as-virus framing with a crime-as-beast framing.
It should be noted that there are two somewhat different
metaphorical frameworks that treat crime as an illness. In one, the
community or population is seen as an organism, and crime is a
disease that is developing inside that organism (e.g., ‘‘Violent
crime is a cancer that eats away at the very heart of society.’’). In
another, the community is seen as individual agents and crime is a
contagious disease that can be passed on from one person to
another forming an epidemic. In this paper the stimuli did not
strongly distinguish between these different varieties of crime as
illness metaphors, but doing so would be an interesting extension
of this work, as these metaphors suggest somewhat different
implications for treating crime.
Experiment 1. In the first experiment, participants were
presented with one of two versions of the crime paragraph. The
two versions of the paragraph differed only in the embedded
metaphor: In one, crime was a beast; in the other, crime was a
virus. The majority of the paragraph consisted of crime statistics,
which were the same in both versions. Half of the participants
were given the crime-as-beast version and half the crime-as-virus
version. The paragraph read:
Crime is a {wild beast preying on/virus infecting} the city of
Addison. The crime rate in the once peaceful city has
steadily increased over the past three years. In fact, these
days it seems that crime is {lurking in/plaguing} every
neighborhood. In 2004, 46,177 crimes were reported
compared to more than 55,000 reported in 2007. The rise
in violent crime is particularly alarming. In 2004, there were
330 murders in the city, in 2007, there were over 500.
This report was followed up with two questions: 1) In your
opinion what does Addison need to do to reduce crime? 2) Please
underline the part of the report that was most influential in your
decision. This question was aimed at discovering if participants
explicitly noticed or made use of the metaphor.
Experiment 2. The crime report used in the second
experiment was similar, but not identical to the one used in
Experiment 1. Importantly, it instantiated the beast or virus
metaphor for crime with a single word. It read as follows:
Crime is a {beast/virus} ravaging the city of Addison. Five
years ago Addison was in good shape, with no obvious
vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, in the past five years the city’s
defense systems have weakened, and the city has succumbed
to crime. Today, there are more than 55,000 criminal
incidents a year - up by more than 10,000 per year. There is
a worry that if the city does not regain its strength soon, even
more serious problems may start to develop.
In Experiment 2, we asked three follow-up questions in
the following order: 1) In your opinion what does Addison
need to do to reduce crime? 2) What is the role of a police officer
in Addison? 3) Please copy the part of the report that was
most influential and paste it in the text area below. Questions
one and two were free-response. Question three was copy
and paste (participants were shown the report adjacent to
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e16782an open text field and were asked to copy the portion of the
report that was most influential in their reasoning and paste it
into the open text field).
Experiment 3. The design of Experiment 3 was similar to
that of Experiment 2; however, before participants read the crime
report, they were shown the word ‘‘beast’’ or the word ‘‘virus’’ and
were asked to ‘‘list a synonym’’ for it. After completing this task,
they were presented with the paragraph on crime in Addison on a
separate screen. The crime report used in Experiment 3 was the
same as the crime report for Experiment 2, except that it did not
contain a virus or beast metaphor. The first sentence of the report
read: ‘‘Crime is ravaging the city of Addison.’’ It was otherwise
identical to the report from Experiment 2.
Experiment 4. The crime report used in Experiment 4 was
the same as the crime report used for Experiment 2. However,
instead of asking the follow-up questions from Experiments 2 and
3, we asked participants to select one of four crime-related issues
for further investigation – with the knowledge that this information
should be used to help them make a more informed crime-
reducing suggestion. The instructions read as follows: ‘‘Now
imagine that Addison has consulted you about the crime problem.
You have the resources to investigate one of the following four
issues. Please select one from the list below.’’ The issues included:
1) the education system and availability of youth programs, 2) the
economic system including the poverty level and employment rate,
3) the size and charge of the police force, and 4) the correctional
facilities including the methods by which convicted criminals are
punished.
Experiment 5. The materials and task in Experiment 5 were
identical to those of Experiment 4 except, instead of presenting the
metaphor frame at the beginning of the report, we presented the
metaphor frame at the end of the report, as shown below. All other
aspects of the design were identical to Experiment 4. The
paragraphs used were:
Five years ago Addison was in good shape, with no obvious
vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, in the past five years the city’s
defense systems have weakened, and the city has succumbed
to crime. Today, there are more than 55,000 criminal
incidents a year - up by more than 10,000 per year. There is
a worry that if the city does not regain its strength soon, even
more serious problems may start to develop. Crime is a
{beast/virus} ravaging the city of Addison.
Design
In Experiment 1 the survey was included in a larger packet of
questionnaires that were unrelated to this study.
In Experiments 2–5, each step of the experiment was presented
on a separate screen. That is, the initial crime report was presented
on a screen by itself. After participants read the report and clicked
a button indicating they had finished reading it, the report
disappeared and the first follow-up question appeared on a screen
by itself. Similarly, each subsequent question was shown on a
separate screen. On the final screen, participants were asked
several background questions (e.g., What is the first language you
learned to speak?).
Participants in Experiments 2–5 were explicitly instructed not to
use the ‘‘back’’ button on their browser. If they did use the ‘‘back’’
button, the experimental session was terminated. This ensured
that participants did not reread the crime report when they were
later asked questions about it.
Results
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we explored whether framing a crime problem
with one of two contrasting metaphors for crime could
systematically influence how people reasoned about the problem.
Participants were presented with one of two versions of the crime
paragraph (as detailed above) and asked a set of free response
follow-up questions. Of particular interest, participants were asked
how they would recommend solving Addison’s crime problem.
Coding. Proposed solutions to the crime problem in Addison
were coded into two categories in line with the results of the
norming study described in the introduction: 1) diagnose/treat/
inoculate, and 2) capture/enforce/punish. Responses were
categorized as ‘‘diagnose/treat/inoculate’’ if they suggested
investigating the underlying cause of the problem (e.g., ‘‘look for
the root cause’’) or suggested a particular social reform to treat or
inoculate the community (e.g., fix the economy, improve
education, provide healthcare). Responses were categorized as
‘‘capture/enforce/punish’’ if they focused on the police force or
other methods of law enforcement (e.g., calling in the National
Guard) or modifying the criminal justice system (e.g., instituting
harsher penalties, building more jails). For brevity, we will refer to
the ‘‘diagnose/treat/inoculate’’ category as ‘‘reform’’ and the
‘‘capture/enforce/punish’’ category as ‘‘enforce.’’
Each participant’s response was weighted equally – as a single
point towards the analysis. For solutions that solely emphasized
either reform or enforcement, the respective category was
incremented by a point. Responses that exclusively emphasized
one approach were the majority. Occasionally, however, partic-
ipants listed both types of suggestions. In this case, if the response
listed a disproportionate number of suggestions that were
consistent with one approach (e.g., if the response listed three
suggestions in line with reform and only one in line with
enforcement, as in ‘‘investigate the root cause, institute new
educational programs, create jobs, and hire more police’’) then it
was coded as a full point for the corresponding category. However,
if the response equally emphasized both approaches, then the
point was split between the categories such that each was
incremented by .5.
Thirty of the 485 responses (6%) did not fit into either category.
In every case this was because the response lacked a suggestion
(e.g., ‘‘I don’t know’’, ‘‘I need more information’’, ‘‘It should be
addressed’’). These data were omitted from analysis.
Participants’ crime reducing suggestions were coded blindly by
two coders. Cohen’s kappa – a measure of inter-rater reliability –
was .75 indicating good agreement between the coders (p,.001).
All disagreements between the coders were resolved between them
before analyzing the data.
Results. Overall, participants were more likely to emphasize
enforcement strategies (65%) than reform (35%), x
2=41.85, p,.001.
However, as predicted, the solutions participants proposed to the
crime problem in Addison differed systematically as a function of the
metaphorical frame encountered in the crime report (see Fig. 1).
Participants given the crime-as-beast metaphorical framing were
more likely to suggest enforcement (74%) than participants given the
crime-as-virus framing (56%), x
2=13.94, p,.001. See Table 1 for
response frequencies.
Interestingly, when asked to identify the most influential aspect
of the report, most participants ignored the metaphor. Only 15
participants (3%) identified the metaphoric frame as influential to
their problem solving strategy. Removing these participants from
the analysis did not affect the results (the proportion of responses
that were congruent with the metaphor was not different in the
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2=.0001, p=.991). The vast majority of the
participants identified the statistics in the crime report as being
most influential in their decision – namely, the final three
sentences of the paragraph that state the increasing crime and
murder rate.
Discussion. In this experiment, we found that crime-
reducing suggestions differed systematically as a function of the
metaphor used to frame the crime problem. Participants who read
that crime was a virus were more likely to propose treating the
crime problem by investigating the root causes of the issue and
instituting social reforms than participants who read that crime
was a beast. Participants who read that crime was a beast were
more likely to propose fighting back against the crime problem by
hiring police officers and building jails – to catch and cage the
criminals – than participants who read that crime was a virus.
Further, despite the clear influence of the metaphor, we found
that participants generally identified the crime statistics, which
were the same for both groups, and not the metaphor, as the most
influential aspect of the report. These findings suggest that
metaphors can influence how people conceptualize and in turn
approach solving an important social issue, even if people don’t
explicitly perceive the metaphor as being especially influential.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we made two substantive changes to the task
to further test the role of metaphor in reasoning. First, we changed
how the metaphoric frame was presented. In Experiment 1, the
metaphoric frame was established several times and included vivid
relational language. For example, crime was said to be either
preying & lurking, or infecting & plaguing the community. These
metaphorical verbs explicitly specified relations between crime and
the community. Is specifying relations explicitly in this way
necessary for people to make appropriate inferences, or might
people be able to spontaneously extract the relevant relational
inferences given a minimal metaphorical suggestion? Might a
single carefully chosen and appropriately placed word be enough
to instantiate a metaphorical frame and induce different reasoning
strategies?
In Experiment 2 we tested this hypothesis by removing the
relational verbs from the report. We replaced them with a single
word metaphor that described crime as a ‘‘virus’’ or ‘‘beast’’ in the
introductory sentence. The two conditions differed only in this one
word, and otherwise included all the same information.
The second change we made was that we added an additional
follow-up question: What is the role of a police officer in Addison?
This question aimed to disambiguate the modal crime-reducing
suggestion from Experiment 1, which was ‘‘increase the police
force.’’ In that context, we interpreted the response (and close
variants of it) as a suggestion for increased law enforcement and
punishment. However, police officers do not just catch and punish
criminals. They also serve as crime deterrents, educators, and role
models and it is possible that some participants intended for the
increased police presence to serve in this way. Including this
question allowed these participants an opportunity to explicitly
specify how they envisioned the increased police force impacting
the community.
Participant characteristics. We restricted our analysis of
the initial sample of 347 Turkers to residents of the United States
who were native English speakers. This left data from 253
participants for analysis (i.e., 94 participants were excluded – 27%
of the initial dataset). Of these 253 participants, 157 were female
and 96 were male. Their ages ranged from 18 to 66, with a mean
age of 32 (and median age of 29). Eighty-two reported an
affiliation to the Democratic Party, 57 reported an affiliation to the
Republican Party, and 114 were Independent.
Coding. Crime-reducing suggestions were coded into two
groups (reform and enforcement) as they were in Experiment 1.
However, in Experiment 2 we coded one additional feature of this
question: whether the participant exclusively suggested increasing
the police force. For these responses, we planned to use the follow-
up question about the role of a police officer in Addison to
disambiguate whether the participant thought a police officer’s
primary role was as an instrument of social reform and prevention
or an instrument of law enforcement and punishment.
Interpretations of the role of a police officer were coded into two
groups that were analogous to the categories created for the first
question: 1) crime deterrent, and 2) law enforcer and punisher.
Interpretations that emphasized the police officer’s role in
preventing crime, educating youth, or serving as a role model in
the community were coded as ‘‘crime deterrent.’’ Interpretations
that emphasized the police officer’s role in catching criminals,
Figure 1. Proportion of proposed solutions to crime by
metaphor frame.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.g001
Table 1. Response frequencies for each of the five experiments by condition and response category.
EXPERIMENT 1 2 3 4 5
CONDITION beast virus beast virus beast virus beast virus beast virus
ENFORCE 170 126.5 80 72 75 66 33 21 27 30
SOCIAL 61 97.5 33 61 43 36 50 74 61 54
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.t001
The Role of Metaphor in Reasoning about Crime
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‘‘law enforcer and punisher.’’ As in Experiment 1, each response
contributed one point to the analysis. This point either went
entirely to one of the two categories or was split evenly between
them.
Seven (3%) crime-reducing suggestions and 18 (7%) police
officer interpretations were not coded. In every case this was
because the response lacked a suggestion or interpretation and
were eliminated from the analysis. It is possible that relatively
more police officer interpretations fell into this category because
the question was not prefaced with ‘‘In your opinion’’ (several
responses to this question were a variant of ‘‘the report didn’t say
what the role of a police officer in Addison was’’).
Answers to both of the free response questions were coded
blindly by two coders. Inter-rater reliability was high for both:
Cohen’s kappa for crime-reducing suggestions was .86 (p,.001);
Cohen’s kappa for interpretations of the role of a police officer was
.72 (p,.001). All disagreements between the coders were resolved
between them before analyzing the data.
Results. The results of Experiment 2 replicate our findings
from Experiment 1. Participants were again overall more likely to
suggest enforcement (62%) than reform (38%), x
2=13.67, p,.01.
However, the tendency towards enforcement was more
pronounced among participants who read that crime was a
beast (71%) than among participants who read that crime was a
virus (54%), x
2=6.50, p,.05. See Table 1 for response
frequencies by condition.
Of the responses, 81 (31%) exclusively suggested increasing the
police force. Disambiguating these responses by the participants’
corresponding views of the role of a police officer in Addison
further clarified the effect of the metaphor. Because ‘‘police’’
responses were previously coded as enforcement, disambiguating
them created an overall shift to the reform category in both
conditions, with a larger shift in the virus condition as predicted.
With the ‘‘police’’ responses disambiguated, 37% of the responses
advocated enforcement in the virus condition, and 59%
advocated enforcement in the beast condition, x
2=10.76, p,.01
(see Fig. 2).
Further, as in Experiment 1, participants did not explicitly
report the metaphor as being influential in their reasoning. Only
18 of the 253 participants (7%) identified the metaphor as
influential. Excluding participants who identified the metaphor as
influential did not change the reported results (the proportion of
responses that were congruent with the metaphor was not different
in the two analyses, x
2=.01, p=.92).
Discussion. Results of Experiment 2 replicate and extend the
findings of Experiment 1. Manipulatingthe metaphor used to frame
the issue of crime influenced how people approached solving the
crime problem. When crime was framed as a virus, participants
were more likely to suggest social reform. Alternatively, when crime
was framed as a beast, participants were more likely to suggest law
enforcement and punishment.
Remarkably, presenting an otherwise identical report with only
one word different in the introductory frame (‘‘Crime is a virus/
beast ravaging the city of Addison’’) yielded systematically different
problem solving suggestions just as in Experiment 1. While in
Experiment 1, the metaphoric frame was established using vivid
verbs with rich relational meaning (e.g., crime was said to be either
preying & lurking, or infecting & plaguing). The findings of
Experiment 2 demonstrate that these relational elements need not
be specified explicitly. People spontaneously instantiated the
relevant relational inferences even given a single metaphorical
noun in Experiment 2.
Further, in Experiment 2 we asked participants to provide their
views on the role that a police officer should play in Addison. This
afforded us a clearer interpretation of their crime-reducing
suggestions and boosted our power to detect the influence of the
metaphor.
Interestingly, despite the clear influence of the metaphor, we
found that participants generally identified the crime statistics,
which were the same for both groups, and not the metaphor, as
the most influential aspect of the report.
Figure 2. Proportions of responses to ‘‘solve the crime problem in Addison’’ (with ‘‘increase police’’ disambiguated). The left panel
displays results from Experiment 2 (with a one-word metaphor frame); the right panel displays results from Experiment 3 (in which a synonyms task
preceded the non-metaphorically framed paragraph).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.g002
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In Experiment 3 we tested whether the influence of the
metaphor observed in the first two studies could have come about
through simple spreading activation from lexical associates of the
words ‘‘beast’’ and ‘‘virus.’’ Perhaps simply hearing a word like
beast, even outside of the context of crime, would activate lexical
associates like ‘‘hunting’’ and ‘‘caging’’. These activated lexical
associates might then color people’s descriptions of how to solve
the crime problem. To test for this possibility we dissociated the
words ‘‘beast’’ and ‘‘virus’’ from the rest of the crime report in
Experiment 3. Before reading the crime report, participants were
asked to provide a synonym to the word ‘‘beast’’ or the word
‘‘virus’’ – thereby priming representations for a beast or a virus.
They then read the same report about crime as in Experiment 2,
but with the metaphorical word omitted (‘‘Crime is ravaging the
city of Addison’’). Might a non-metaphorical lexical prime have
the same effect as a metaphor?
Participant characteristics. Of the 312 Turkers that were
initially sampled for Experiment 2, 76 (24%) were excluded
because they did not live in the United States or because they were
not native English speakers. This left data from 236 participants
for analysis. Of these 236 participants, 136 were female and 100
were male. Their ages ranged from 18 to 81, with a mean age of
29 (and median age of 26). Seventy-six reported an affiliation to
the Democratic Party, 48 reported an affiliation to the Republican
Party, and 112 were Independent.
Coding. Answers to the free response questions were coded as
they were in Experiment 2. Fifteen crime-reduction suggestions
(6%) and 21 police officer interpretations (9%) did not fit into
either category. In every case this was because the response lacked
a suggestion or interpretation.
Answers to both of the free response questions were coded
blindly by two coders. Inter-rater reliability was high for both:
Cohen’s kappa for crime-reducing suggestions was .87 (p,.001);
Cohen’s kappa for interpretations of the role of a police officer was
.84 (p,.001). All disagreements between the coders were resolved
between them before analyzing the data.
Results. The synonyms that participants listed were analyzed
to ensure that the lexical prime had the intended effect. Of the 124
participants in the crime-as-beast condition, all except one listed a
synonym of ‘‘beast’’. The modal response was ‘‘animal’’, but
others included ‘‘monster’’, ‘‘mongrel’’, ‘‘invader’’, etc. The single
respondent who did not list a synonym to ‘‘beast’’ instead wrote ‘‘I
forget what a synonym is.’’ This participant’s subsequent responses
were omitted from the analyses reported below. Of the 112
participants in the crime-as-virus condition, all listed a synonym of
virus. In this case, the modal response was ‘‘disease’’, but others
included ‘‘bug’’, ‘‘cold’’, ‘‘sickness’’, ‘‘illness’’, etc.
In Experiment 3, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, there was no
difference in crime-reducing suggestions as a function of the
condition – i.e., whether the participant listed a synonym to ‘‘virus’’
or ‘‘beast’’ before reading the crime paragraph did not affect what
solutions they suggested to the crime problem. Overall, participants
were significantly more likely to suggest enforcement or punishment
(64%) than social reform (36%), x
2=18.0, p,.001; however, there
was no difference between participants who were lexically primed
with ‘‘beast’’ (64% suggesting enforcement and punishment) versus
those who were lexically primed with ‘‘virus’’ (65%), x
2=.001,
p=.99. See Table 1 for response frequencies by condition.
Further, disambiguating the responses that called for an
increase to the police force did not differentiate the groups.
Sixty-eight of the 235 responses (29%) were disambiguated. Of
these, 29 (43%) interpreted the role of a police officer as a crime
deterrent, 37 (54%) interpreted the role of a police officer as a law
enforcer or punisher, and two responses could not be disambig-
uated. This disambiguation did not reveal a difference between
conditions: Participants who were lexically primed with ‘‘virus’’
were no more likely to suggest enforcement (50%) than those who
were lexically primed with ‘‘beast’’ (51%), x
2=.006, p=.94 (see
Fig. 2).
Comparing the results from Experiments 2 and 3 we find an
interaction between the form in which the word ‘‘beast’’ or ‘‘virus’’
is presented (i.e., metaphor vs. lexical prime) and the extent to
which crime-reducing suggestions are congruent with the prime.
That is, we find that the metaphor in Experiment 2 was
significantly more influential than the lexical prime in Experiment
3. To quantitatively compare the results of the two experiments we
performed a chi-square contingency test as well as a set of logistic
regressions. In Experiment 2, 61% of the responses were
congruent with the metaphor (i.e., suggested ‘‘reform’’ when
presented with crime-as-a-virus or suggested ‘‘enforcement’’ when
presented with crime-as-a-beast), whereas only 50% of the
responses in Experiment 3 were congruent with the lexical prime,
x
2=4.23, p,.05. Similarly, a logistic regression revealed that an
interaction term for experiment X condition was a significant predictor
of people’s crime-fighting suggestions: a model that included the
three predictors (experiment, condition, and the interaction term)
was significantly better than a model with two predictors (omitting
the interaction term), x
2 (1, 459)=5.85, p,.05.
Discussion. In Experiment 3 we tested whether the influence
of the metaphor observed in the first two studies could have come
about through simple spreading activation from lexical associates
of the words ‘‘beast’’ and ‘‘virus.’’ We dissociated the words
‘‘beast’’ and ‘‘virus’’ from the story, so that they could act as non-
metaphorical lexical primes. These disconnected lexical primes did
not yield differences in people’s crime-fighting suggestions. These
results suggest that metaphors act as more than just isolated words
– their power appears to come from participating in elaborated
knowledge structures.
Additionally, the results of Experiment 3 shed some light on this
population’s baseline preference for reducing crime. That is, in
Experiment 2 it might have been the case that participants had a
general preference for reducing crime through enforcement and
that it was the crime-as-virus frame alone that shifted peoples’
responses. The results of Experiment 3, however, suggest that the
population does not seem to favor either of the two crime-reducing
suggestions absent a metaphoric frame and that both frames are
influential.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we tested whether the influence of the
metaphor would persevere even if people were able to select
responses from a full set of options. One possibility is that a
metaphorical frame affects what kind of solution comes to mind
easiest. However, when faced with a complete set of options,
people may realize they had neglected to attend to other
alternatives and no longer show the influence of the metaphor.
For example, a participant in the ‘‘beast’’ frame may not have
spontaneously thought to address underlying problems in the
economy or education. However, if these are made explicitly
available as response options, the participant may recognize them
as good ideas and may re-bound from the metaphorical framing.
To test for this, in Experiment 4, we presented participants with a
list of four possible approaches to the crime problem and asked
them to choose one. These included two options that were more
consistent with social reform (education, economy) and two
options that were more consistent with enforcement and
punishment (police, jails).
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suggestion as in previous studies, the task in Experiment 4 was to
select an area to investigate further (in preparation to making a
crime-fighting suggestion). This aspect of the experiment was
designed to test whether metaphors can affect not only how people
propose solving the problem of crime, but also how they go about
gathering information for future problem solving. If participants
seek out information that is likely to confirm the initial bias
suggested by the metaphor, this may be a mechanism for metaphors
to iteratively amass long-term effects on people’s reasoning (as
people seek out more and more confirming evidence).
Participant characteristics. Of the 185 Turkers who
participated in Experiment 4, seven (4%) were excluded because
they did not live in the United States or because they were non-
native English speakers. This left data from 178 participants for
analysis. Of these 178 participants, 89 were female and 89 were
male. Their ages ranged from 18 to 70, with a mean age of 31 (and
median age of 28). Seventy-eight reported an affiliation to the
Democratic Party, 28 reported an affiliation to the Republican
Party, and 72 were Independent.
Coding. Choosing to gather additional information about the
education system or economic system was coded as a social reform
category of response; gathering additional information about the
police force or criminal justice system was coded as an
enforcement and punishment category of response.
Results. Results of Experiment 4 replicate the effects of
metaphorical frames found in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants
who were presented with the crime-as-a-beast metaphor were
more likely to gather additional information about the city’s
criminal justice system (40%) than participants who were
presented with the crime-as-a-virus metaphor (22%), x
2=5.72,
p,.05. See Table 1 for response frequencies by condition.
As we saw in Experiments 1 and 2, when given the opportunity
to identify the most influential aspect of the report, the vast
majority ignored the metaphor. Only 27 participants (15%)
reported that the metaphor influenced their decision. Eliminating
these participants from the analysis does not change the results (the
proportion of responses that were congruent with the metaphor
was not different in the two analyses, x
2=.003, p=.96).
Discussion. In Experiment 4 we found that the effect of
metaphorical framing persists even when the list of all possible
approaches to solving crime is explicitly presented. Laying out four
possible approaches to crime shifted the overall likelihood that
people wanted to pursue social reform. It seems that explicitly
seeing the space of possible responses makes people more likely to
attempt reducing crime through reform than enforcement.
However, we still found that peoples’ responses were influenced
by the frame that they read. Additionally, the results of
Experiment 4 reveal that the metaphorical frame influences how
people go about gathering information for future problem solving.
People tended to seek additional information about the city that
confirmed their initial (metaphor-induced) suspicion about how to
solve crime.
Experiment 5
In Experiment 5 we investigated the time-course of how
metaphors influence people’s construal of and reasoning about
problems. One possibility is that metaphors influence reasoning by
instantiating a knowledge frame that structures subsequent
information. After being exposed to the metaphor, participants
may assimilate all further information they receive into this
knowledge structure, instantiating any ambiguous information in a
way that would be consistent with the metaphor. For example,
words like ‘‘vulnerabilities’’, ‘‘defense’’, ‘‘weakened’’ may take on
different meanings depending on whether they are understood in
the context of viruses or beasts [13,19]. If this is the case, if
metaphors actively coerce incoming information, then metaphors
should have the most impact when they are presented early, such
that their impact can accumulate in the course of assimilating
further information.
Alternatively, if metaphors simply activate a fossilized package
of ideas and do not encourage the kind of assimilation process
described above, then they should be most effective when they are
presented late in the narrative, as close to when people are asked
to reason about a solution as possible. This way, the memory of
the metaphor should be fresh and any knowledge activated by it
should have the best chance to influence reasoning. In Experiment
5, we repeated the design of Experiment 4, but moved the
metaphorical frame so that instead of being the first sentence in
the crime report it was the last.
Coding. As in Experiment 4, choosing to gather additional
information about the education system or economic system was
coded as a social reform category of response; gathering additional
information about the police force or criminal justice system was
coded as an enforcement and punishment category of response.
Results. As in Experiment 4, participants in Experiment 5
were overall more likely to gather information relating to the city’s
social situation (67%) than the criminal justice system (33%),
x
2=19.55, p,.001.
However, unlike Experiment 4, there was no effect of the
metaphorical frame. Participants who were presented with the
crime-as-a-beast metaphor were about equally likely to gather
additional information about the city’s social situation (69%) as
participants who were presented with the crime-as-a-virus
metaphor (64%), x
2=.29, p=.59 (see Fig. 3). See Table 1 for
response frequencies by condition.
This pattern was significantly different from the effects found in
Experiment 4, x
2=5.45, p,.05. That is, significantly more
participants were influenced by the metaphor when it was
presented at the beginning of the report (Experiment 4) than at
the end of the report (Experiment 5). This conclusion is also
supported by a logistic regression, which revealed that an
interaction term for experiment X condition was a significant predictor
of people’s crime-fighting suggestions: a model that included the
three predictors (experiment, condition, and the interaction term)
was significantly better than a model with two predictors (omitting
the interaction term), x
2 (1, 346)=5.34, p,.05.
As we saw in the previous experiments, when given the
opportunity to identify the most influential aspect of the report, the
vast majority ignored the metaphor. Only 18 participants (10%)
reported that the metaphor influenced their decision.
Discussion. In Experiment 5 we investigated whether when a
metaphor is introduced affects the metaphor’s influence.
Experiment 5 repeated the design of Experiment 4, but we
moved the metaphorical frame so that instead of being the first
sentence in the crime report it was the last. Unlike the results of
Experiment 4, this late metaphorical framing had no effect on
people’s crime-related information foraging. These findings
suggest that metaphors can gain power by coercing further
incoming information to fit with the relational structure suggested
by the metaphor.
These results are particularly striking since in Experiment 5, the
metaphorical frame appears in much closer proximity to the
measure of interest. It would have been reasonable to predict that
a metaphorical frame that is more fresh in mind should have the
largest effect. Instead, the way a metaphorical frame is integrated
into the narrative appears to be more important. This finding also
helps allay a possible worry about the findings in Experiment 3. In
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crime story, and asked participants to generate synonyms to these
words before they read about crime. When the words appeared in
this way as disconnected lexical primes, they had no influence over
people’s crime-fighting suggestions. Of course, one possibility is
simply that taking the words out of the narrative also made them
more distant in time from the measure of interest. Results of
Experiment 5 suggest that it is integration at the right point in the
narrative rather than simple temporal distance that modulates our
effects. In Experiment 5, the words ‘‘virus’’ and ‘‘beast’’ occurred
immediately prior to the measure of interest, and yet had no effect.
Discussion
In five experiments we investigated the role of metaphor in
guiding how people reason about the complex problem of crime.
Wefoundthat metaphorsexertaninfluenceoverpeople’s reasoning
by instantiating frame-consistent knowledge structures, and inviting
structurally-consistent inferences. Further, when asked to seek out
more information to inform their decisions, we found that people
chose information that was likely to confirm and elaborate the bias
suggested by the metaphor – an effect that persisted even when
people were presented with a full set of possible solutions.
Our results suggest that even fleeting and seemingly unnoticed
metaphors in natural language can instantiate complex knowledge
structures and influence people’s reasoning in a way that is similar
to the role that schemas [20,21], scripts [22,23], and frames [24]
have been argued to play in reasoning and memory [13,25–27].
That is, the metaphors provided our participants with a structured
framework for understanding crime in Addison, influenced the
inferences that they made about the crime problem, and suggested
different causal interventions for solving the problem. This was
true even though the metaphors themselves did not strike our
participants as particularly influential.
Consistent with previous work on meaning instantiation, we find
that the metaphors were most effective when they were presented
early in the narrative and were then able to help organize and
coerce further incoming information. For example, Bransford and
Johnson demonstrate that a procedural description of washing
clothes was understood and remembered best when participants
knew the topic of the passage before they heard the description
[13]. When the topic was given at the end of the passage or not at
all, participants reported being unable to make sense of what they
had heard and were able to recall few details of the description on
a memory test. While the crime passage we used was clearly not as
ambiguous as the procedural description of washing clothes used
by Bransford and Johnson, it did contain many words and phrases
that would likely be interpreted differently in the different contexts
represented by the metaphoric frames. For instance, in the context
of an attacking beast the meaning of the words ‘‘vulnerable’’ and
‘‘defense system’’ may be different from what the same words
would be taken to mean in the context of a spreading virus.
Previous work has demonstrated that contextual cues can strongly
influence how people interpret seemingly unambiguous text
[19,28–29].
A further question is how such knowledge structures for thinking
about crime emerge? How do people build virus-like or beast-like
representations of crime and what is the role of linguistic metaphor
in encouraging the construction of such knowledge structures? One
potential mechanism is offered by work in analogical reasoning
[6,30–35]. For example, Bowdle & Gentner suggest that metaphors
when first encountered are processed as analogies or structural
alignments [35]. When we first hear about crime described as a
beast, for example, we may carry out comparisons to discover any
alignable similarities between crime and beasts. If such similarities
are discovered, they can license the transfer of inferences from one
domain to the other, and the most striking or stable structural
similaritiescanbehighlightedand storedinmemory.Withexposure
to the system of ‘‘beast’’ metaphors, an elaborated knowledge
structure can emerge for thinking about crime that mirrors in
important relationalstructuretherepresentationswe have about the
behavior of wild beasts. Through analogical transfer in this way,
systems of metaphors in language can encourage the creation of
systems of knowledge in a wide range of domains. Our reasoning
about many complex domains then can be mediated through these
patchworks of analogically-created representations.
A final question is how strong the influence of metaphorical
framing really is? Focusing on a real-world social issue like crime
allows us to compare the effects of metaphor we observe in the lab
with the opinion differences that exist naturally in the population.
Figure 3. Seeking additional information. The left panel displays results from Experiment 4 (with a one-word metaphor frame at the beginning
of the report); the right panel displays results from Experiment 5 (with the same one-word frame but at the end of the report).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016782.g003
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how to address societal problems like crime. How do the
differences we find between metaphorical conditions compare to
those between Democrats and Republicans, for example?
At the end of Experiments 2–5, we asked participants to report
their political affiliation (Democrat, Independent, or Republican)
and their gender. We found a predictable relationship between
political affiliation and the tendency to emphasize enforcement in
one’s response. Across the four experiments, 48% of responses from
Republicans emphasized enforcement whereas only 40% of
responses from Democrats and Independents emphasized enforce-
ment (data from Democrats and Independents did not differ from
one another and so were collapsed). A logistic regression revealed
political affiliation to be a significant predictor of people’s crime-
fighting suggestions: comparing a model with political affiliation
included as a predictor to a constant-only model was statistically
significant, x
2 (1, 839)=3.98, p,.05. We also found systematic
differences by gender: 46% of responses from men and 38% of
responses from women suggested enforcement. Comparing a logistic
regression model with gender included as a predictor to a constant-
only model was statistically significant, x
2 (1, 839)=5.389, p,.05.
Impressively the differences in opinion generated by the
metaphorical frames were larger than those that exist between
Democrats and Republicans, or between men and women.
Metaphorical frames caused shifts of 18–22% in enforcement
responses in Experiments 2 and 4. Differences between people of
different political affiliations or between the two genders were 8–
9%. To statistically compare the strength of these different
predictors, we fit a set of logistic regression models for data from
Experiments 2 and 4. We found that a model fit with a predictor
for metaphor frame was significantly better than a constant-only
model, x
2 (1, 839)=17.35, p,.001; however, including a predictor
for gender, x
2 (1, 839)=0.013, ns, or political affiliation, x
2 (1,
839)=2.06, ns, or both, x
2 (3, 839)=3.03, ns, did not improve the
model significantly. This analysis reveals a striking effect of
metaphor as measured against real-world differences in opinion
that exist in the population and impact policy-making.
Interestingly, we found that self-identified Republicans were
also less likely to be influenced by the metaphors than were
Democrats and Independents. Looking at data from Experiments
2 and 4 we find that 63% of the responses from Democrats and
Independents are congruent with the metaphorical frame, whereas
only 49% of those from Republicans were congruent with the
metaphor. A logistic regression revealed that political affiliation
was indeed a significant predictor of congruence with the
metaphorical frame: comparing a model with political affiliation
as a predictor against a constant-only model was statistically
significant, x
2 (1, 839)=5.46, p,.05. These results may be
consistent with previous analyses showing a difference in openness
between people of different political affiliations [36]. Men and
women were equally influenced by the metaphorical frames.
The studies presented in this paper demonstrate that even
minimal (one-word) metaphors can significantly shift people’s
representations and reasoning about important real-world do-
mains. These findings suggest that people don’t have a single
integrated representation of complex issues like crime, but rather
rely on a patchwork of (sometimes disconnected or inconsistent)
representations and can (without realizing it) dynamically shift
between them when cued in context.
Metaphor is incredibly pervasive in everyday discourse. By
some estimates, English speakers produce one unique metaphor
for every 25 words that they utter [37]. Metaphor is clearly not just
an ornamental flourish, but a fundamental part of the language
system [28,38]. This is particularly true in discussions of social
policy [5,39–40], where it often seems impossible to ‘‘literally’’
discuss immigration, the economy, or crime. If metaphors
routinely influence how we make inferences and gather informa-
tion about the social problems that confront us, then the
metaphors in our linguistic system may be offering a unique
window onto how we construct knowledge and reason about
complex issues.
Conclusions
The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused
with metaphor. In five experiments, we have explored how these
metaphors influence the way that we reason about complex issues
and forage for further information about them. We find that
metaphors can have a powerful influence over how people attempt
to solve complex problems and how they gather more information
to make ‘‘well-informed’’ decisions. Our findings shed further light
on the mechanisms through which metaphors exert their
influence, by instantiating frame-consistent knowledge structures,
and inviting structurally-consistent inferences. Interestingly, the
influence of the metaphorical framing is covert: people do not
recognize metaphors as an influential aspect in their decisions.
Finally, the influence of metaphor we find is strong: different
metaphorical frames created differences in opinion as big or bigger
than those between Democrats and Republicans.
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